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This report summarizes a track II U.S.-Turkish dialogue organized by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) 
in Istanbul, Turkey, on February 26–27, 2015. While addressing a range of issues affecting U.S.-Turkish 
strategic cooperation and the role of Turkey in NATO, the discussions focused on the challenges and 
opportunities that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the dynamics of nuclear weapons 
proliferation pose to U.S.-Turkish strategic cooperation.  
The dialogue was supported by the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC) of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center on Contemporary 
Conflict. PASCC is sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).1  The dialogue was co-
chaired by Ms. Jessica Varnum and Mr. Sinan Ulgen. Dialogue participants included sixteen leading 
subject matter experts from the nongovernmental community, eight American and eight Turkish. The 
two-day dialogue was structured to be discussion-centric and action-oriented. Breakout working groups 
on the second day were tasked with identifying specific short- and long-term steps that could address 
challenges identified, or otherwise strengthen the state of the relationship. All participants operated under 
the Chatham House Rule.  
This track II dialogue was the second iteration of a 2012 U.S.-Turkish strategic dialogue, also 
sponsored by PASCC and carried out by the Naval Postgraduate School with USIP participation. Building 
on this first initiative, the 2015 Istanbul dialogue goal was to further broaden—and to begin to 
institutionalize—a nongovernmental exchange between the two countries on matters related to global 
security, nonproliferation, and nuclear security in order to achieve a more stable, resilient, and transparent 
strategic relationship. Several of the participants and observers attended the 2012 talks in various 
capacities; they were joined on this occasion by subject matter experts new to the forum who could speak 
to different dimensions of the always evolving U.S.-Turkish strategic relationship. 
This summary of the 2015 dialogue is organized to closely and faithfully convey the flow of the 
discussions and the key topics that the participants addressed at each session. Cutting across all of these 
discussions was a common theme the participants raised in different ways and at different moments, and 
which thus bears emphasis before a more detailed narrative of the discussions is provided. That theme is 
simply this: the United States and Turkey are nearing a pivotal point in their security relationship. The 
alliance between the United States and Turkey faces serious structural challenges. Left unattended, these 
problems could weaken the capacity of Turkey, the United States, and the North Atlantic Treaty 
                                                          
1 See the website http://www.dtra.mil/About.aspx.  
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Organization (NATO) to tackle a myriad of growing security and nuclear weapons proliferation 
challenges in the Middle East. Participants noted that in the two years between the 2012 and 2014 
dialogues, the geostrategic U.S.-Turkish relationship and the overall nonproliferation context had 
dramatically evolved. Today, the important bilateral relationship is colored by regional security dynamics, 
such as the civil war in Syria and the spread of the Daesh terror group (also known as the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria, or ISIS; the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL; and simply the Islamic State, IS) 
across the Levant, Iran’s growing regional activism, and the efforts of the international community to 
reach an agreement with Iran on its nuclear program, and by a more assertive Turkish foreign policy that 
mirrors important domestic dynamics in that country. With U.S. economic and military resources 
increasingly stretched and a U.S. domestic arena that may be less supportive of U.S. military engagement 
abroad, the United States faces challenges in meeting its commitments to its friends in general and its 
NATO allies in particular. This reality has clearly affected the U.S.-Turkish relationship as much as 
Turkey’s own evolving domestic politics are now shaping its increasingly complicated relationship with 
the United States. 
The dialogue included forthright exchanges by both sides regarding how to meet these various 
challenges, the contemporary strengths and challenges in the relationship, the threat perception 
commonalties and divergences and the implications of both for the U.S.-Turkish relationship, and the 
development of possible actionable items and areas for formal and informal collaboration. The following 
narrative highlights the key follow-up and action-oriented ideas and recommendations that emerged, 
particularly during the concluding after-discussion. At the core of all these proposals was the recognition 
that it is crucial for the United States and Turkey to enhance existing mechanisms of cooperation and 
dialogue, and to create new avenues by which experts from the two countries can enter into a partnership 
dedicated to addressing security and weapons proliferation needs in a region that is increasingly unstable 
and facing new and even unprecedented security challenges. The 2015 Istanbul dialogue, if it is it to have 
any lasting strategic value, must set the stage for a longer and more institutionalized effort to enhance 
U.S.-Turkish strategic problem solving in a manner that meets regional challenges even as it reflects the 
particular sensitivities and concerns of both countries.  
The Proliferation Context: Regional NBC and Missile Capabilities 
Turkey’s volatile geographic location and its domestic and allied defense capabilities have major 
implications for the U.S.-Turkish relationship. In discussing regional nuclear, biological, and chemical 
(NBC) threats, participants—particularly those from Turkey—emphasized that the threat of a biological 
or chemical attack on Turkish soil is real. There is regional precedence for the use of such agents: Egypt, 
Syria, and Iraq have all used chemical weapons in the past quarter century. Syria presents an overt 
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chemical weapons threat even if it has disarmed in accordance with UNSCR 2118. There is concern about 
latent biological weapon capabilities throughout the region. A radiological threat exists, but it is modest 
and relates mostly to the transshipment of delivery system materials. Despite recognition of the threat, 
Turkish and U.S. participants believed that Turkey lacks some of the military doctrine, strategy, technical 
concepts, and equipment to prevent or adequately respond to an NBC attack.  
Turkey is increasingly pursuing a chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) response 
capability, a development that partly reflects its concerns over security along its borders with Syria. Yet 
this is a nascent issue for Turkey. Indeed, Turkish participants indicated that despite the possibility of a 
regional CBR threat, for the time being—and in the coming years as well—the relevant academic and 
strategic communities will lean toward enhancing nuclear expertise rather than addressing the CBR 
challenge. This posture influences not only Turkish budgeting priorities and procurement choices but also 
military preparation. A coherent process of equipment procurement and training is lacking. For example, 
while there is a new Air and Missile Concept command established under the Turkish Air Force, there is 
no chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) school under the Air Force. Training for this 
threat is housed under the Land Forces (the Turkish Army). Those tasked with preventing a threat are in a 
different force from those being trained to respond to it.  
On the consequence-management side, no single agency possesses the full mandate and 
capabilities to handle the response comprehensively. There was some agreement among participants that 
this is a public health issue, to be led by Turkey’s Disaster and Management Agency (AFAD). However, 
Turkey remains beleaguered by interagency coordination challenges that result in no small part from an 
ongoing process of new institution building within the government. These challenges are exacerbated by 
the fluid face of Turkish politics and multiple varying talking points, making it difficult for Turks and 
Americans alike to identify the specific agency, office, or individual who can speak with authority or 
implement change on the matter. 
Given these characteristics in their response planning, Turkish civilian agencies would benefit 
from CBRN training and policy assistance, possibly complemented by capacity-building efforts, to the 
benefit of AFAD, either through bilateral U.S.-Turkey channels or through NATO. While participants 
agreed both channels would be appropriate, and noted the role of a formal alliance on CBRN issues, they 
also noted that Turkey is politically sensitive to direct U.S. involvement. Broadly speaking, such training 
and policy guidance could address incident response and consequence management from a civilian rather 
than military perspective. A more narrowed U.S.-Turkey collaboration could center on designing an 
interagency process in which Turkey could address such issues, drawing on Turkish requirements and 
past Turkish and U.S. interagency experiences and practices. A dialogue or joint study of the medical and 
health challenges associated with a CBR threat was also raised, with some participants noting the 
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particular assets and resources that NGOs could bring to bear in mitigating and managing the aftermath of 
a CBR attack. For example, the United States has built up the dual-use nature of its existing medical 
infrastructure and considered ways to optimally employ it in the event of a biological weapon attack. This 
approach could prove useful for Turkey as it considers its own consequence-management options. Indeed, 
dialogue participants emphasized that the very real and looming CBR threat in the region offers an 
additional and compelling reason to create a more effective and enduring mechanism for U.S.-Turkish 
dialogue and partnership.  
Attitudes toward the Nonproliferation Regime 
The United States and Turkey agree that international collaboration forms the cornerstone of nuclear 
nonproliferation efforts. As such, tending to the health of nonproliferation treaties and organizations is an 
important theme in the bilateral relationship. The discussion yielded several areas of converging attitudes 
about nonproliferation while also uncovering points of divergence that cannot be resolved in a strictly 
nongovernmental forum. However, validating the concerns and frustrations associated with varying 
nonproliferation mechanisms can be beneficial, both in terms of the substantive information gained and in 
terms of the relationship management. 
One such government forum in which to address differences is the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) Review Conference (currently under way at the time of writing of this report), or through the 
alternate cycle preparatory committee (PrepCom) tasked with the “preparation for the Review Conference 
in terms of assessing the implementation of each article of the NPT and facilitating discussion among 
States with a view to making recommendations to the Review Conference,”2 as part of the run-up to the 
2020 Review Conference. Turkish participants informed the group that the PrepCom Turkish position 
stated that deterrence should no longer be the foundation of the nuclear relationship. The Turkish 
perspective is that nuclear deterrence efforts are inadequate for confronting the asymmetrical warfare 
threats facing global security today, and that NATO must revisit what deterrence means today in a non–
Cold War global order. Further, while many participants argued that Turkey was pleased in an overall 
political sense with the past NPT outcomes, there is growing concern that the implementation of key 
resolutions had been delayed or drawn out in a manner frustrating to the country.  
Another major point of contention was Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership. With 
respect to the NSG, Turkey maintains that special accommodations of membership requirements should 
not be instated. The United States, however, has supported India’s bid for inclusion regardless of its non-
NPT status. The Turkish participants stated that Turkey’s stance is not influenced by politics or by its 
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special relationship with Pakistan but rather is based on a basic commitment to upholding the principles 
and the prestige of the NPT regime. Arguments for India’s membership, if realized in a manner 
inconsistent with NSG membership requirements, may be interpreted internationally as a further 
marginalization of Pakistan and could destabilize relationships and security. With regard to group 
dynamics, the NSG bases many of its rulings on the NPT as a reference point. The inclusion of a non-
NPT group in a rule-by-consensus body such as the NSG could generate intergroup conflict or freeze 
decision making. Finally, providing benefits associated with NSG membership in the absence of 
compliance with the NPT erodes the draw and the authority of the NPT. Both U.S. and Turkish 
participants agreed that expanding the NPT to include both India and Pakistan is in the best interest of 
nonproliferation, though it was acknowledged that significant work will be required to realize this goal.  
Shifting from Turkey’s southern border to its neighbor to the east, the discussion of 
nonproliferation and regional security could not ignore Iran. Iran ranks high on both Turkish and 
American nonproliferation agendas, though for different reasons. There are important differences in the 
two countries’ attitudes toward nonproliferation, differences that largely stem from their disparate 
interpretations of “intent” and “capability.” The U.S. view of Iran’s nuclear program reflects an abiding 
concern that Iran desires, or intends to develop, nuclear weapons, and that without substantial constraints 
on “breakout,” Iran will pose a threat to the vital security interests of the United States. Turkey, however, 
sees Iran’s quest for an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle through a larger geostrategic lens, as Turkey 
believes that if Iran acquires a nuclear capacity, it will use this advantage to project great regional power 
in ways that will pose challenges for regional stability and interwar deterrence. As one participant noted, 
Turkey views Iran as more of a long-term political and geostrategic interest priority than a short-term 
security threat. At the same time, other Turkish participants did note that Iran’s strategic weapons 
systems, and particularly the country’s development of medium-range deployable missiles, demonstrate 
capability and possible intent. Therefore, while threat perceptions may be shared within the bilateral 
relationship regarding Iran, there are varying degrees of urgency, and Turkish participants emphasized 
that directly naming Iran as a threat is undesirable politically.  
Turkish participants highlighted Ankara’s support for the efforts of the P5+1 states to reach an 
agreement on Iran’s nuclear program. The negotiations, it was argued, confirm Turkey’s belief in—and 
commitment to—the NPT, and to the rights and obligations it establishes in regard to the peaceful use of 
nuclear technology in particular. While some participants wondered whether a U.S.-Iran rapprochement 
could affect the regional balance of power dynamics in ways that could prove worrisome to Turkey, 
Turkish participants largely argued that any agreement that might help normalize Iran’s relations with the 
region—and with the wider international community—would greatly benefit Turkey economically.  
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If a nuclear deal cannot be reached, some participants suggested, Turkey’s confidence in the NPT 
regime will erode. They doubted, however, that a failure to reach a deal would create a watershed moment 
in the region. Turkey, for instance, would not rush to arm. Instead, it would probably abide by UN 
sanctions on Iran while not imposing its own bilateral sanctions. On the other hand, if an agreement were 
reached but Iran subsequently used the NPT to secure technological advances that would effectively have 
it breaking out of the treaty, far greater damage would be done to the NPT in terms of its credibility and 
its capacity to manage or limit nuclear proliferation.  
Finally, it should be noted that the discussion of Iran, the P5+1 talks, and the fate of the NPT 
echoed more fundamental and wider challenges to the U.S.-Turkish relationship, many of which were 
sounded throughout the dialogue. Paradoxically, it seems that a belligerent Iran has often received far 
more U.S. attention than Turkey, a U.S. ally and a partner. Indeed, some Turkish participants added that 
they often feel dictated to by U.S. policymakers, who seem ready to go their own way, with or without 
Turkish support or consultation. That Iran often appears to be the only regional power that has benefited 
from escalating turmoil in the Middle East seems especially paradoxical, given that, by design or default, 
U.S. policies have contributed to the region’s chaos.  
The Role of NATO 
The United States and Turkey are both key NATO players that must contend with the changing face and 
pace of post–Cold War alliance threats. They are not always on the same page, however. Debates about 
deterrence throughout the discussion culminated in the articulation of a shared view, namely, that while 
deterrence has often proved ineffective with respect to  the lower-level threats destabilizing the region, it 
has worked reasonably well when it comes to maintaining state-state order and restricting conflict 
between nuclear states. In fact, because there has not been a major state-led attack on a NATO member, 
the Turkish participants largely believed that the government would not lobby for the removal of the 
forward-deployed weapons from NATO member-states. They saw the deployment of Patriot missiles 
along the border with Syria as clear proof of NATO’s enduring treaty commitments to Ankara. However, 
if the alliance moved to remove nuclear weapons from NATO, Turkey would not block a consensus on 
this issue. At the same time, participants raised other scenarios, including a reposturing of NATO that 
might leave Turkey as the lone NATO member with forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons. While 
some argued that such a scenario would strengthen U.S.-Turkish relations, as the strategic importance of 
Turkey’s role would proportionally increase, others saw such a situation as undesirable from Turkey’s 
perspective as it could weaken NATO members’ solidarity and burden sharing.  
Turkey wishes to become a major defense industry player, as evidenced by the recently increased 
staff, budget, and physical headquarters of the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), an 
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appendage of the Turkish Ministry of National Defense.3 This ambition drives the current tender for 
missile defense capabilities, a major contemporary issue in the U.S.-Turkish relationship. Turkey is 
currently considering bids by Raytheon (the U.S. maker of the Patriot missile defense system), Eurosam 
(a French-Italian consortium), and Precision Machinery (a Chinese missile maker currently under U.S. 
sanctions).  
Turkish participants listed stringent laws restricting technology transfers and high cost as reasons 
the U.S. bid would likely not be accepted. American participants countered that businesses in America 
operate independently of the government and thus the legal obstacles to transfers were daunting. Further, 
the U.S. industry has operated under a “once burned, twice shy” attitude toward Turkish tenders. There 
wasn’t a desire to aggressively pursue tenders, especially as the industry functions outside U.S. 
government influence and political considerations are not decision drivers. One participant said that 
“Ankara has a terrible reputation” with regard to tenders, source codes, intellectual property, and export 
controls. Turkish participants suggested that there have been instances of relaxed export control laws with 
some of America’s strategic partners, such as Qatar and Israel, but neither side was able to offer evidence 
either refuting or adding credence to this commonly held Turkish assumption. Ultimately, U.S. 
participants emphasized that Turkey was asking for things from the U.S. private sector that the private 
sector could not give.  
One option possible for this particular tender is the adoption of a hybrid strategy combining bids 
from Raytheon and Eurosam. Europeans have demonstrated more flexibility than Americans with regard 
to technology transfer in the past. The group also thought a U.S. or European subsidy of a hybrid solution 
might offset the price of a Western-produced system and ease public pressure. Any decision made by 
Turkey will be equal parts economic and political, however, and there are other influencing factors than 
Western preferences for Turkey’s purchase of an allied-produced system.  
Beyond the narrow issues related to technology transfers, many participants argued that if Turkey 
develops its program independently of NATO, there could be serious consequences for the NATO 
alliance. Particularly if the missile defense system is procured from a non-NATO ally, such as China, or 
from a firm on a Western-backed sanctions list, such as Precision Machinery, for security reasons it will 
                                                          
3 According to the Turkish news source Anadolu Agency, Turkey's defense industry achieved high growth rates in 
recent years, with more than $5 billion in 2013, including $1.5 billion in exports. Exports to the United States 
reached $680 million in 2013 and $336 million to EU member countries (Anadolu Agency, “Turkey Eyes Defense 
Industry Cooperation with Europe,” 3 Dec. 2014, http://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/430188--turkey-eyes-defense-
industry-cooperation-with-europe). Production for domestic purposes is also on the rise. According to the SSM, 
Turkey imported only 10 percent of its equipment in 2014, compared to 40 percent in 2012 and 75 percent in 2003 





not be interoperable with the radar based in Turkey as part of NATO’s system. Such a situation would be 
difficult and possibly even untenable, as it would render Turkey vulnerable in ways that would vastly 
increase strains on the NATO relationship. This could in turn create a watershed moment in the bilateral 
relationship between Turkey and China, leading to future procurements and Turkish-Chinese military 
trainings and exchanges, all of which would jeopardize other military technology cooperation with 
NATO. Precision Machinery’s sanctioned status also could not be ignored as a major security and 
political hurdle. It is worth noting that a number of the Turkish participants expressed skepticism as to 
whether Turkey would actually move forward with the Chinese bid. At the same time, they laid out the 
strategic justifications given by the Turkish government for such a decision, in so doing indicating that a 
tender was not driven by purely economic considerations. Participants agreed that no decision has been 
made as to which missile system Turkey would procure, and that it would likely happen after Turkey’s 
elections in June 2015. With that timeline in place, they further agreed that the decision window—and 
with it the opportunity to influence that decision—is closing.  
A NATO-led approach communicating the possible consequences of Turkey procuring a 
Chinese-made missile system that prevents interoperability with NATO systems was repeatedly called 
for. Participants believed communications helmed by NATO would achieve better results than 
communications taking place through bilateral channels. A NATO-led approach could include the 
production of a white paper by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Defence and Security Committee 
laying out the first- and second-degree impacts of such a purchase, and the United States convening a 
North Atlantic Council meeting to address the issue, followed by a press conference convened by 
NATO’s Secretary General. Conversely, the NATO Parliament could convene, which would bring in 
Turkish Parliament members, who could then carry the message back to their domestic base. There is also 
a role for nongovernmental actors in augmenting communication. A joint op-ed or report on the potential 
consequences for the NATO relationship and Turkey’s place in the West, if published in strategic 
international newspapers, could influence Turkish attitudes in ways that might be beneficial for all 
concerned parties.  
Turkey believes the U.S.-led coalition campaign against Daesh fails to address the roots of 
extremism. In the absence of a plan to remove Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad from power, Turkey will 
remain vulnerable to the Syrian threat on its border. Participants determined that NATO, which has not 
officially joined the coalition, has a limited role in this matter. However, a Turkish-led, NATO-supported 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission along the Turkish-Syrian border could provide 
appropriate political cover, domestically and globally, for Turkey to play a larger role in efforts to combat 
Daesh. This kind of joint mission would help Turkey’s efforts to avoid directly confronting Daesh in light 
of the group’s geographic proximity while also responding to domestic pressures for Turkey to assert 
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leadership in the foreign policy arena. NATO could also work to develop an allied plan for managing the 
return of foreign terrorist fighters, given the large number of fighters from member-states.  
Civil Nuclear Technology 
The unlocking of nuclear energy would fulfill a growing energy demand as Turkey’s economy and 
population both expand. U.S. and Turkish participants affirmed that under the NPT, states in compliance 
with their treaty obligations have the legitimate right to pursue nuclear enrichment and reprocessing 
capabilities for energy reasons. However, some participants noted that the U.S. security priority to rank 
nonproliferation over access (or as a prerequisite to access) to nuclear power creates a tension in the 
relationship. U.S. concerns were underlined, as one participant noted, by the fact that in the next ten to 
twenty years, the Middle East civilian nuclear landscape is expected to change dramatically. Just five 
years ago, there were no operational nuclear power reactors in the region.  
In light of these developments, Turkey’s path to civilian nuclear capability is paved with 
uncertainty that both Americans and Turks are eager to manage. Turkey has entered into an agreement 
with Russia’s Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Agency to build the Akkuyu nuclear power plant under a 
build-own-operate (BOO) model. Under such a model, Russia would provide the bulk of financing and 
technical expertise, build and operate the power plant, and handle the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. In 
return, Turkey has agreed to purchase 70 percent of the electricity output at an average fixed price of 
12.35 cents per kilowatt-hour.4 
Akkuyu is to be the first ever nuclear power plant built using the BOO model.5 Surmounting the 
formidable obstacle of obtaining upfront funding comes at other costs, however. A regulatory and 
operating history for the reactors being built does not exist. Turkey will face unique obstacles in ensuring 
on-site and off-site security. In case of disaster management, Turkey’s AFAD will lead the response, in 
coordination with the Rosatom operators. Yet assurances that operators would speak Turkish, or even 
remain on the scene in the case of a nuclear disaster, are nominal at best. The regulatory system in Turkey 
lacks independence from the government, challenging the regulator’s ability to compel the operator to 
                                                          
4 See the website http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2013/2013-02-11-02-14-TM-
INIG/20.smirnov.pdf. 
5 While Akkuyu is the first nuclear power plant that will be built according to the BOO model, Russia has entered 
into eighteen other similar contracts— some of which will involve the BOO model—outside Russia, according to 
the World Nuclear Association. Akkuyu will be the first nuclear power plant built under current timelines. This 
model has the ability to drastically change the landscape of nuclear power plant construction. For many states 
seeking to build an initial nuclear program, the huge market advantage that states experience in securing funding and 
the benefit of Russia managing the disposal of spent nuclear fuel make the model lucrative for the host state. 
Participants indicated that such a model is already forcing traditional suppliers to restructure. 
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follow regulations. As one participant said, “What leverage does the regulator have? The answer may be 
‘nyet.’” 
Turkey is a newcomer to nuclear energy and lacks the depth of expertise, training, and systems 
accrued over time necessary to address the myriad challenges it faces. The IAEA has created a BOO unit 
to assist in addressing challenges associated with this increasingly popular model. Participants grappled 
with whether there was an additional role for the United States to play in this development as part of the 
bilateral relationship. Such a role may in fact be limited to training aimed at expanding Turkey’s pool of 
regulatory expertise or to sharing safety and security best practices.  
Examples of this kind of cooperation may be drawn from past U.S.-U.A.E. engagement on this 
matter, especially in light of the strong parallels between the four U.A.E. plants currently under 
construction in cooperation with the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) and the Turkish 
projects.6 In that instance, the United States (and former U.S. regulatory officials in particular) played a 
significant role in partnering with the U.A.E. to develop its regulatory, safety, and security programs. 
Similarly, various U.S. experts and organizations could be useful partners for sharing peer-to-peer best 
practices on how to handle regulation, safety, and security issues in a situation in which a foreign country 
and foreign nationals are responsible for building and operating reactors. Such practices could include 
conversations and planning around what qualifies as a severe accident scenario, the identification of who 
vets and provides security clearances for foreign personnel to ensure nuclear security standards are being 
met, and consideration of how the host nation’s Design Basis Threat can be properly developed while 
respecting the intellectual property concerns of the foreign company. The differences between a 
nationally operated reactor and one managed by a foreign entity must be identified and planned for at all 
levels, and the U.A.E.’s experience presents an initial baseline for Turkey to work from.  
The challenges arising from this BOO model and contract with Russia extend beyond the 
operational arena into the political sphere. Turkey is in an awkward position between its NATO allies, 
who are alarmed by Russian aggression, and the pragmatic recognition that Russia incurs zero penalties 
under contract if it reneges on its commitments. Adding further pressure to Turkey’s relationship with 
Russia is Russia’s current state of finances, given that Moscow has expanded this model into other 
countries, thus further squeezing funds available for the Akkuyu project. Thus Turkey has financial 
reasons to accommodate Russia, domestically7 and internationally. In short, geopolitics matter greatly to 
                                                          
6 The U.A.E.’s nuclear power plant is being built and will be operated by South Korea’s state-owned utility KEPCO, 
although the deal’s structure is not directly analogous to the BOO model, .  
7 An example of how Turkey’s domestic appeasement of Russia plays out is an allegedly deeply flawed 
environmental assessment that was accepted by Turkey under dubious conditions, out of an interest in sticking to 
Russia’s timeline. Many experts believe the environmental impact assessment submitted by Russia’s JSC Akkuyu 




Turkey. Echoing this point, several Turkish participants argued that there was no role for the United 
States in shaping Turkey’s relationship with Russia in regard to building a nuclear reactor.  
Turkey is pursuing a second reactor, to be built by a Japanese-French joint venture. While not a 
BOO model, it too represents a deviation from conventional approaches and will pose challenges of its 
own. The construction of the Sinop reactor, named after its Black Sea coastal city location, is scheduled to 
begin in 2017, providing a longer timeline to work out many of the anticipated challenges.  
For Turkey, setting up an engagement between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the 
appropriate agencies in Turkey, such as the Turkish Atomic Energy Agency, could be very useful. Such 
cooperation could be enhanced by interaction between the civilian nuclear industries in the United States 
and Turkey, starting perhaps with the United States’ Nuclear Energy Institute in Washington, D.C., and 
expanding to leading university programs. Turkey still lacks the critical national infrastructure necessary 
for such a project, and these industry discussions could address the larger infrastructure needed to support 
the reactors that will be coming online in the next ten to fifteen years. Some participants further posited 
that enhancing the level of public debate and subsequent political pressure to enact necessary reforms 
could be useful, but they noted that this kind of approach is—once again—most successful when the 
regulatory system operates independently of the government. A third area in the bilateral relationship with 
the United States is the implementation of peer-to-peer best practice sharing in the field of civilian nuclear 
power acquisition. This kind of cooperation could be initiated by identifying governmental and 
nongovernmental resources that the United States could offer in this area.  
The U.S.-Turkey Relationship 
In addition to identifying many areas of convergence and divergence on matters central to the U.S.-
Turkish nonproliferation relationship, the conference also advanced important insights into the state of the 
bilateral relationship in general. Overall, participants believed that the U.S.-Turkish relationship is one of 
great and growing importance to both nation-states. Nevertheless, all admitted that there are political, 
security, and economic hurdles that need to be overcome for the relationship to reach its full potential. 
Indeed, there was broad agreement that the alliance between the United States and Turkey faces serious 
structural challenges and that, if left unattended, these problems could weaken the capacity of Turkey, the 
United States, and NATO to cooperate. One participant noted that the relationship was “rocky, abrasive 
and complicated,” and that many things work reasonably well but are much more difficult than they ought 
to be. Others argued that the difficulties that the United States and Turkey have encountered are not 
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unique to the current moment: rooted in deeper historical and structural factors, they transcend the 
challenges of the moment or any particular configuration of leaders.  
Efforts to address these various challenges must include both initiatives pursued over a short time 
horizon and the development and implementation of longer-term institutional mechanisms for managing 
strains in U.S.-Turkish and Turkish-NATO relationships. Participants did note that there are steps both 
governments can take to reduce tensions. Among these steps, the most important is creating a more 
collaborative relationship based on a spirit of equality, partnership, and pragmatic problem solving. This 
would require enhancing existing mechanisms of bilateral communication and creating new avenues for 
cooperation, particularly in light of the Turkish perception that to date, American-driven communication 
in the form of diplomatic demarches, briefings, and requests has marginalized Turkey in the decision-
making process. The United States is seen to cooperate with other NATO allies or to fall back on 
unilateral actions, thus further complicating U.S.-Turkish relations.  
If enhancing mechanisms of cooperation and communication is essential, all participants 
recognized that social, political, and economic changes in Turkey have reshaped popular and elite 
perceptions of Turkey’s foreign relations, and its relationship with the United States in particular. This 
dynamic has fostered an abiding desire that cuts across the Turkish political spectrum for a more 
“balanced” and “mutual partnership.” The challenge is to address these expectations in ways that 
strengthen rather than complicate (much less undermine) the U.S.-Turkish partnership. But to achieve this 
balance, Turkey also needs to match its foreign policy aspirations with its capabilities. Turkey desires to 
be a principal interlocutor on regional issues. However, its current capacity and its resource level—which 
is especially pronounced when it comes to expertise in a number of relevant fields—do not match these 
aspirations. Thus, it was suggested, Turkey should engage more with NATO allies through diverse 




The U.S. Institute of Peace organized the two-day track II dialogue to advance the relationships and 
understanding of both American and Turkish participants regarding the timely and important NBC and 
missile nonproliferation challenges in ways that would strengthen overall U.S.-Turkish and Turkish-
NATO relations. The good news is that such a goal certainly remains in reach, insofar as Turkey’s 
support for NATO and its reliance on alliance deterrence remain strong and constant. At the same time, 
however, a shift in the American paradigm regarding Turkey could help create the conditions for the 
genuine and lasting U.S.-Turkish partnership to which both countries aspire. As developments in Turkey 
and the wider Middle East have become increasingly complicated, at times straining Ankara’s relations 
with both the United States and NATO, this quest for a true and lasting partnership is even more 
important today. 
To strengthen these vital relationships in a spirit of trust and mutual cooperation, Turkey and the 
United States should consider a range of steps, including the following: 
1. Create a permanent and dedicated institutional mechanism that would provide a forum for 
pragmatic problem solving by Turkish and U.S. leaders and policymakers. 
2. Support this official effort by creating a parallel U.S.-Turkish Strategic Dialogue Group 
consisting of Turkish and U.S. policy experts drawn from NGOs and think tanks. 
3. Build on the progress made at the February 2015 Istanbul track II meeting by planning for 
regular track II meetings to be held in 2015 and beyond.  
None of these recommendations constitutes a panacea. But absent a genuine effort to consider these or 
other similar initiatives, rifts in the relationship as highlighted in the preceding dialogue summary will 
likely continue to widen, with possibly serious negative consequences.  
 
 
 
